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RICŒUR’S CONCEPT OF DISTANCIATION AS A CHALLENGE 
FOR THEOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS
IntroductIon
As the title of our conference suggests, its aim is to concentrate our 
attention, in Ricœur’s hermeneutics, on the dimension of poetics in con-
nection with religion. I propose to put a specific accent on the concept 
of ‘poetics’: I would like to interpret it in the sense of ‘poiesis’, creativ-
ity, creative fulfilment. To reformulate the topic, I propose to ask the 
following question: which are Ricœur’s categories for interpreting and 
understanding the poietical aspect of religion? For me as a theologian, 
this question represents an important challenge to theological herme-
neutics, even if Ricœur was very careful in connection with theology as 
a global discipline, and especially with systematic theology! He was 
more open-minded for biblical hermeneutics, where it is possible to be 
closer to texts. He seemed to be afraid that the systematizations of the 
systematic theologians could kill the poietical dynamics at stake in the 
biblical texts1.
Nevertheless, I will try to cope with the poetics of religion from the 
point of view of theological hermeneutics, trying to seize it as a challeng-
ing issue not only for biblical scholars, but more generally for theolo-
gians in different theological disciplines, including systematic theology!
My hypothesis is that the central aspect in the poietical dimension of 
religion is the movement of distanciation. This is directly connected to 
Ricœur’s hermeneutics because, in my feeling, this concept is a main 
concept in Ricœur’s hermeneutics as a whole2. For that reason, my start-
ing point will be an article first published in English in 1973 about The 
Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation3. The first part of my paper will 
be devoted to a presentation of the main perspectives of this hermeneuti-
cal function of distanciation. In a second part, I will then try to reflect 
1. For Ricœur’s fear about too strong systematizations in theology, see: Herméneu-
tique de l’idée de Révélation, in La révélation, Bruxelles, Facultés universitaires Saint-
Louis, 1977, 15-54.
2. I tried to show this importance of distanciation in an introductory article to Ricœur’s 
work: P. Bühler, “Als Leser finde ich mich nur, indem ich mich verliere”: Zur Ein-
führung in die Hermeneutik Paul Ricœurs, in Theologische Zeitschrift 62 (2006) 399-419.
3. P. rIcœur, La fonction herméneutique de la distanciation, in Du texte à l’action, 
101-117 (in my own English translation). 
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4. Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik (1960), in 
H.-G. Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 51986, pp.?.
5. La tâche de l’herméneutique, in Du texte à l’action, 75-100, p. 97.
6. Ibid., p. 102.
about the role of distanciation in the poietics of religion. Finally, in the 
third part, my aim will be to give some examples how what I shall call 
‘the poietics of distanciation’ can be a challenging issue to different the-
ological disciplines. 
In my first part, I will stick to Ricœur, and even more precisely, to 
only one of his many articles, but to a main one; in the second and third 
part, I’ll be going on distance a little bit, making a kind of distanciation 
from Ricœur, to use his concept of distanciation more freely, in my own 
way, in the context of theological hermeneutics. In some way, I am going 
to use Ricœur’s hermeneutical category of distanciation in a metaphorical 
way for showing how it can help to grasp and to understand main aspects 
of religion and theology. 
I. the hermeneutIcal FunctIon oF dIstancIatIon
1. Underlining a Difference with Gadamer’s Hermeneutics
Ricœur begins his article with a short discussion of Gadamer’s concep-
tion of distanciation. For Gadamer, distanciation is mainly perceived 
negatively, as a downfall, as alienation, destroying participation that 
expresses itself primarily by a belonging. For this reason, there is in 
Gadamer a constant struggle between belonging, as the fundamental 
situation of understanding, and distanciation, perceived as a negation of 
this belonging. Therefore, as Ricœur stresses, Gadamer’s title Wahrheit 
und Methode4 expresses a radical alternative: truth cannot be experienced 
with the help of a method because a method always puts things on dis-
tance, leads to an objectivation hindering precisely the happening of a 
real experience of truth. As Ricœur once said in another article: “The 
question is then to which point the book deserves to be called: Truth and 
Method, and if its title should not rather be: Truth or Method”5.
In contrast to Gadamer, Ricœur wants to develop a positive conception 
of distanciation by concentrating on the phenomenon of the text. In this 
perspective, the text becomes a fundamental model for human commu-
nication in its historicity. It reveals “that it is a communication in and 
through distance”. From that point of view, distanciation gets a “positive 
and productive function”6. In connection with the topic of our confer-
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7. These methods can be connected to the effort of explanation as well as the effort of 
comprehension. As it is well known, Ricœur strives to overcome Dilthey’s opposition; see 
Expliquer et comprendre, in Du texte à l’action, 161-182.
ence, we could say: a poietical function, and my aim is to discover this 
poietics of distanciation, especially for religion and theology.
2. Five Steps of Distanciation
In his article, Ricœur develops this argument in five steps, five succes-
sive experiences of distanciation helping progressively to deepen the 
hermeneutical reflection.
The first distanciation happens through performing language as a dis-
course. A discourse is unique as a historical event involving a speaker 
and listeners in a concrete situation. But at the same time, it transmits a 
signification through language as a general issue. Signification, mediated 
through language, gets into the event of this particular discourse. Without 
being reduced to this event, transcending it at the same time, it becomes 
a concrete communication through the happening discourse. Therefore, 
this concrete discourse represents a first step in creating distanciation.
The second distanciation happens by performing the discourse as a 
literary work. The speaker becomes an author impregnating his or her 
work with specific characteristics. In this way, through the creative activ-
ity of his or her composition, the author produces distance by giving to 
his discourse a specific style, by entering it in a literary genre, etc. So, 
as a work, the message gets objective structures that can be analyzed by 
different methods of interpretation7.
The third distanciation is connected to the phenomenon of writing: 
when the author becomes a writer, his or her word gets another status: 
the text acquires autonomy in regard to its author: “what the text signi-
fies doesn’t coincide with what the author wanted to say”8. It has now 
its own destiny. Therefore, at the same time, the addressee also changes. 
Disconnected from the concrete situation of a discourse, the text can be 
read by every person that is able to read it, in this language, with this 
vocabulary, etc. That distanciation, creating a distance between the text 
and its author, opens new conditions for understanding.
The fourth distanciation is to be found in the reference of the text by 
establishing a second degree’s reference to the Lebenswelt of the reader. 
In the romantic hermeneutics (Schleiermacher, Dilthey), the text was 
reduced to be mainly an access to its author, in his or her geniality. This 
way is no more possible if the text has its own destiny of reception. But 
that does not oblige us to concentrate simply on the analysis of the text’s 
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8. Ibid., p. 111.
9. See his contribution in the present volume.
10. . Ibid., pp. 116-117: “Dès lors, comprendre, c’est se comprendre devant le texte”. 
It has to be stressed here as an important accent for Ricœur: comprehension happens in 
front of the text, and not by going beyond, or behind the text, as it is often the case in 
classical hermeneutics (for example in the allegory). 
11. Ibid., p. 117: “Lecteur, je ne me trouve qu’en me perdant”.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. This is the last sentence of the article.
14. See his contribution in the present volume.
structures, like in the text theories of the structuralism. In the text, there 
is a ‘Sache’ (in German), a ‘chose’ (in French), and it can be understood 
as a new perspective on the world that the text offers to its reader. In that 
way, the text goes on distance in regard to the ‘normal’, everyday-world, 
the Lebenswelt, proposing its own world to the reader. To express this 
dimension, Ricœur speaks of the ‘text’s world’. That means: the world 
that the text deploys, discloses, so that the reader can find in it new pos-
sibilities of being for his or her existing in the world, leading indirectly 
to new possibilities of action, as A. Thomasset has shown9.
That leads us to the fifth distanciation: if the text offers new possi-
bilities of being, it is a mediation for our self-understanding. The sen-
tence has often been quoted: “Understanding means understanding our-
selves in front of the text”10. In classical terms, it is the well-known topic 
of appropriation or application. But in this fifth step, there is also a 
dimension of distanciation. The appropriation cannot happen through a 
direct seizure. Understanding happens not by imposing our effort to 
understand, but by exposing ourselves to the text and getting from it new 
possibilities. The text takes us away from ourselves, puts us on distance 
in regard to ourselves, in order to bring us back to ourselves. To quote 
another famous sentence with a biblical tonality: “As a reader, I find 
myself only by losing myself”11. From this point of view, “comprehen-
sion is as much disappropriation as it is appropriation”12, or we could 
say: appropriation happens only in and through expropriation. Therefore: 
“At all levels of the analysis, distanciation is the condition of understand-
ing”13.
There is clearly a circular structure in the hermeneutical function of 
distanciation: through disappropriation to appropriation, through losing 
to finding, etc. As Boyd Blundell underlines14, this movement of detour 
and return is fundamental for Ricœur. It has to do with the structure of 
the hermeneutical circle, or maybe better: the structure of a hermeneuti-
cal spiral, because the reader does not return to the same point, but gets 
back transformed. To avoid the impression of a circulus vitiosus, Ricœur 
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15. See Temps et récit I, p. 111: “À cet égard, j’aimerais parler plutôt d’une spirale 
sans fin qui fait passer la meditation plusieurs fois par le même point, mais à une altitude 
différente”.
16. For this part of my argument, I refer to G. eBelInG, Dogmatik des christlichen 
Glaubens I, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1979, pp. 111-139 (‘Glaube und Religion’), and Evan-
gelium und Religion, in G. eBelInG, Theologie in den Gegensätzen des Lebens (Wort und 
Glaube, 4), Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1995, 27-43.
himself has suggested this idea in his theory of narration, proposing that 
the ‘circle of mimesis’ could be understood as an ‘endless spiral’15. 
3. A Progressive Deepening, from the Discourse to the Reader
By following the five steps in the article, we could fulfil a progressive 
deepening in the perception of distanciation. It leads us from the dis-
course over the text and its world to the appropriation of the reader. Is it 
possible to use the hermeneutical function of distanciation for under-
standing the phenomenon of religion? Could the little hermeneutics of 
distanciation that Ricœur develops in this article be a kind of key for a 
little hermeneutics of religion? That’s the question I would like now to 
discuss in my second part.
II. dIstancIatIon as a PoIetIcal dImensIon oF relIGIon
1. Religion – ‘relegere16
In a descriptive way, we could define religion as a system of sym-
bols including different representations, beliefs, rituals, institutions, 
values and rules regulating the relationship of human beings with tran-
scendence. But from a hermeneutical point of view, we must do more 
than just describing: the aim is to interpret, to understand the central 
nerve of religion as a specific way for a human being to live in respon-
sibility. Therefore, my question is: could this central nerve of religion 
be the movement of distanciation? To answer this question, it may be 
useful to go back to the etymology of the concept of religion. Since 
Antiquity, this etymology has been in discussion. Many, as for exam-
ple Augustine, have understood religion from the verb ‘religare’: to 
connect, to put in a relationship. But already Cicero proposed to see 
the root of religion in the Latin verb ‘relegere’. Composed with the 
verb ‘legere’, this verb means literally: to read again, but also to recol-
lect, to reassemble, to resume. For Cicero, there is a dimension of 
respect, of veneration in this recollecting, in this resumption. Some-
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17. Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, volume 4, København, Fags Forlag, 1997, 5-96; for 
the French translation: La répétition, in Œuvres complètes, Paris, Orante, volume 5, 1972, 
1-96.
18. Ibid., 97-210; for the French translation: Crainte et tremblement in Œuvres com-
plètes (n. 17), 5, 97-209. This book, written by another pseudonym, Johannes de Silentio, 
was published on the same day as Gjentagelsen!
thing is vital for me and so I take it up again and again, appropriating 
it more and more, in a religious veneration that impregnates my whole 
life.
2. Kierkegaard’s Concept of Repetition
The same dimension of re-reading can also be found in Kierkegaard’s 
work. Constantin Constantius, one of his pseudonyms, has developed the 
category of repetition in a very similar way in his book Gjentagelsen 
(1843)17. It doesn’t mean just repeating things in a naïve sense, but taking 
life up again, in the struggle with a crisis. For the young man of Kierke-
gaard’s fiction, it is a love crisis. The biblical character illustrating this 
concept of repetition is Job, losing everything in a radical trial of his faith 
and, by going through this trial, coming back, recovering his life, his 
world. In a very similar way, we could think of another biblical character 
having a great importance for Kierkegaard: Abraham, in the trial of sac-
rificing his son and then coming back home with him, as told in Genesis 
22 and reflected by Kierkegaard in Frygt og Bæven18. We could also 
think of the nightly fight of Jacob in Genesis 32 and of the way he leaves 
the place at daybreak, limping but blessed!
The ‘re-’ of re-ligion, as re-reading, re-collecting, re-suming, indicates 
that a double movement is accomplished, going and coming, losing and 
finding. Like the biblical characters that Kierkegaard is interpreting, 
through repetition, I am torn away from myself, from my daily life, my 
world in the sense of my Lebenswelt, and I’ll have to find the way back 
to me, or better: I’ll be brought back to me. This double movement that 
we discover here is very similar to what has been described in the first 
part as the movement of an appropriation through expropriation, so that 
we could vary slightly Ricœur’s sentence and say: “As a believer, I find 
myself only by losing myself”. So the believer gets close to the reader 
in the situation of distanciation: an interesting fact, if we remember that 
‘religio’ could come from the verb ‘relegere’, re-reading … I’ll come 
back soon to this point. But we have first to clarify where the root of this 
double movement is to be found.
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19. See Temps et récit I, pp. 109-129.
20. In biblical exegesis, the concept of relecture is used for caracterizing a literary 
procedure, especially in the gospel according to John, consisting in the addition of succes-
sive commentaries; for this theory, see J. ZumsteIn, Kreative Erinnerung: Relecture und 
Auslegung im Johannesevangelium, Zürich, TVZ, 22004; A. dettwIler, Die Gegenwart 
des Erhöhten: Eine exegetische Studie zu den johanneischen Abschiedsreden (Joh 13,31–
16,33) unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihres Relecture-Charakters, Göttingen, Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 1995. 
3. Distanciation in the Relationship between God and Human Being
As we have seen before, there is a dimension of transcendence in 
religion. In the Christian perspective that is ours here, we can express it 
by speaking of the relationship between a human being and the God in 
which he or she believes. This relationship is not just one relationship 
among others in human life: it is the relationship to the ultimate instance 
of life, making everything else in this life penultimate. Standing in front 
of God, or, in the sense of Genesis 32, struggling with God through the 
night, means experiencing a radical distanciation from all other things 
that characterize ‘normal’ human life, Lebenswelt. As for the text’s world 
in the hermeneutics of distanciation, we could say in this hermeneutics 
of religion: in the meeting with God, there is another world deploying 
itself, another world opening unknown possibilities of being. So Job, 
Abraham, Jacob, or we can come back to our world with a new perspec-
tive, in a new light, transforming the everyday-world out of a crisis of 
faith, love, and hope.
4. Religion and Relecture
Religion as a ‘re-movement’ means that in his or her coming back 
from the experience of being confronted with the ultimate instance, the 
believer will be enabled to cope with daily life, his or her ‘Lebenswelt’ 
in a new way. In the terms of Ricœur’s later theory of narrative, we could 
say that, out of a mimesis II, as a configuration, a mimesis III, a refigu-
ration19, can take place in the movement back to ‘normal’ life, making 
this ‘normal’ life different, renewed, and inspired by new possibilities. 
In this way, sticking to the connexion of religion and the Latin verb 
‘relegere’, we could say that, in a hermeneutical perspective, religion is 
a relecture20: coming from the meeting with God, the human being can 
understand himself or herself differently, recollect, reassemble, and 
resume life in a new light.
And as for Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition: this double movement 
may, must be repeated. Because going through expropriation, appropria-
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21. G. eBelInG, Theologie zwischen reformatorischem Sündenverständnis und heutiger 
Einstellung zum Bösen (Wort und Glaube, 3), Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1975, pp. 173-204.
22. See Une herméneutique philosophique de la religion: Kant, in Lectures 3. Aux 
frontières de la philosophie, Paris, Seuil, 1994, 19-40. The article is divided in two parts: 
Le mal radical (pp. 22-27) and La réplique de la religion (pp. 28-40).
23. Ibid., p. 27. That stresses the central meaning of the problem of evil in Ricœur’s 
hermeneutics.
tion is never done for ever, but happens again and again. The certainty 
of faith is never in a safe shelter, but is constantly assailed in the strug-
gles of life. As we have seen above, that movement has not to be a 
vicious circle: it can be interpreted as a spiral helping to deepen the 
experience of faith. In Luther’s theology, we may understand in the same 
dynamic way his accent on the fact that the believer is constantly simul 
iustus et peccator21.
That could be exactly the poietical, the productive, creative power of 
distanciation: to hold faith and life tense, and therefore alive. In this way, 
we may say that there is a ‘poietics of distanciation’ in the depth of reli-
gion. But let’s be precise: I am not saying that every distanciation is 
religious. As we have seen in Ricœur’s article (part I), there are many 
other types of distanciation. But I am stressing that every religious exist-
ence contains a movement of distanciation. In his rereading of Kant’s 
philosophy of religion, Ricœur characterizes this dimension by underlin-
ing that religion is fundamentally a reply to the problem of evil22. Against 
evil, religion expresses the ‘in spite of’ of hope23.
III. PoIetIcs oF dIstancIatIon as a challenGe For  
theoloGIcal hermeneutIcs
What I tried to develop in my second part as a ‘religious poietics of 
distanciation’ has also important implications for the theological work in 
its different disciplines. Because distanciation is the central nerve of reli-
gion, it belongs also to a poietical, creative working in theology as a 
responsible interpretation and comprehension of religion. That happens 
always in a specific tradition, Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, etc. In my 
second part, I have spoken generally of a hermeneutics of religion. If it 
has to be deepened in a theological hermeneutics, it must be now clearly 
named as a poietics of distanciation in a specific faith and, connected to 
this faith, in a specific theology. In my case here, it is the Christian faith 
and theology.
I would like to add two preliminary remarks:
 RICŒUR’S CONCEPT OF DISTANCIATION 159
24. Einführung in die theologische Hermeneutik, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buch-
gesellschaft, 2006. In this book, Körtner presents hermeneutics as a task for every theo-
logical discipline.
25. For the bibliographical references, see G. eBelInG, Praktische Theologie, in Stu-
dium der Theologie: Eine enzyklopädische Orientierung, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1975, 
113-129.
26. See Theologie und Verkündigung: Ein Gespräch mit Rudolf Bultmann, Tübingen, 
J.C.B. Mohr, 21963.
27. G. eBelInG, Wort und Glaube, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 31967, p. 447. 
1. As Ulrich H.J. Körtner has underlined in his book Einführung in 
die theologische Hermeneutik24, theological hermeneutics is not only 
important for the biblical studies; it goes through all different theological 
disciplines, helping them to stay at their common task. For that reason 
the aspects I want to explore in this third part are chosen in different 
disciplines of theology.
2. In 2008, several catholic theologians in have been commemorating 
the 10th anniversary of the encyclical Fides et ratio (1998). In some way, 
this third part will also be a small protestant contribution to this com-
memoration. 
1.  “Theology is Necessary for Making the Task of Proclamation as 
Difficult as Necessary”
I start with a general perspective that has to do with fundamental the-
ology. Theology as a whole is not a speculative, theoretical science, but 
has, as the Reformers of the 16th century as well as Schleiermacher in the 
19th century underlined, a practical orientation, and it gets its real sense 
only from this connection to a praxis25. It has its place in university as 
such a practically oriented science, like other academic disciplines. In 
this way, we can say that theology as a whole is devoted to a concrete 
task: Gerhard Ebeling has formulated it, from a hermeneutical point of 
view, as the task of proclamation (Verkündigung) in its various forms26. 
By working in its different disciplines on the language of faith in the past 
and in the present situation, theology helps all the persons that are respon-
sible for proclamation. But with some irony, Ebeling introduces a moment 
of distanciation: the help doesn’t consist in making the task easy, in 
relieving the responsibility. As he says in an article about the necessity 
of theology: “Theology is necessary for making the task of proclamation 
as difficult as necessary”27. Of course not as difficult as possible, but as 
difficult as necessary! What happens in the event that Ebeling called 
‘Wortgeschehen’, literally ‘happening of word’, is vital and therefore 
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28. For the concept of Wortgeschehen, see Wort Gottes und Hermeneutik, in Wort und 
Glaube, 319-348.
29. F.D.E. schleIermacher, Kurze Darstellung des Theologiestudiums zum Behuf ein-
leitender Vorlesungen, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, (1910), 41993, p. 
10 (§31 of the first edition).
30. Anknüpfung und Widerspruch, in Glauben und Verstehen II, Tübingen, J.C.B. 
Mohr, 31965, 117-132.
must be treated as a demanding task, struggling constantly with the 
hermeneutical difficulties of this ‘happening’28.
2. Proclaiming God as ‘adversarius noster’ (Luther)
From what we just have developed, we can deduce an important indi-
cation for practical theology. To think about the concrete forms of proc-
lamation in the sense of Gerhard Ebeling is especially the task of practi-
cal theology (that’s probably why Schleiermacher considered that 
discipline as being the crown of theology as a whole29). What makes the 
task of proclamation a necessarily difficult one has to be understood as 
a constant challenge of language in its constant try to reach adequately 
its addressees. 
In his hermeneutical articles, Rudolf Bultmann has proposed to treat 
this problem as a dialectic of fastening and opposing, Anknüpfung und 
Widerspruch30, seeing the discourse of the apostle Paul on the Areopa-
gus in Acts 17 as a fundamental model. Taking the altar that was dedi-
cated to the unknown God as a starting point, Paul fastens his proclama-
tion at the religiosity of the people of Athens: “I see that in every way 
you are very religious” (Ac 17,22). But at the same time, he leads them 
to a very precise God, the God in which he believes, and that’s the 
moment of the opposition: “Now what you worship as something 
unknown I am going to proclaim to you” (17,23). The reaction of the 
Athenians will be: “We want to hear you again on this subject” (17,32). 
In other terms, as Bultmann says: the comprehension of God’s alterity, 
as a Deus extra nos, or as Luther once said: the comprehension of God 
as an ‘adversarius noster’, as our adversary, is only possible if it can be 
connected dialectically, by fastening and opposing, to the precompre-
hension of God that is already present inside the human beings. That’s 
the challenge of appropriation through distanciation in the proclamation 
of God’s word. On that point, there is a great proximity between Ricœur 
on one side and Bultmann and Ebeling on the other, bigger than the 
proximity with Barth.
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31. Theologie und Verkündigung, p. 15: “Im Umgang mit dem Text schlägt das Aus-
gelegtwerden des Textes um in ein Ausgelegtwerden durch den Text”.
32. See Wahrheit und Methode, especially pp. 270-312.
3. ‘Lectio difficilior’: Exegesis as Expropriation
As we have seen in our part I, for Ricœur, appropriation through dis-
tanciation happens mainly in front of texts: understanding a text is expos-
ing ourselves to this text, so that we can understand ourselves in the light 
of the text. Or, as Ebeling once underlined in a very similar way: the 
interpretation of the text by the interpreter comes only to its end when 
the interpreter is interpreted by the text31. In this sense, the special chal-
lenge of the exegetical disciplines is that in their working on the texts, 
they let constantly happen this movement back to the interpreter as first 
addressee of the text. With Ricœur, in our days, we can easily observe 
different exegetical methods trying to focus on the historical situation of 
the author and the addressees, on the argumentative or narrative struc-
tures, on the history of reception, etc. During years, Ricœur was in an 
intense dialogue with the biblical scholars working in these different 
fields. Hermeneutically, all these methods are legitimate if they don’t try 
to domesticate, to tame the text, but if they help the interpreter to expose 
himself or herself to the text, letting it work in its alterity to us. The same 
danger occurs in the case of an interpretation of the Bible claiming to 
have the status of an official depositary, in the name of church tradition 
or of the illumination of the Holy Spirit. In this sense, playing with the 
words, we can say that exegesis should be constantly expropriation in 
Ricœur’s sense: expropriation of the text and expropriation by the text. 
This task is a hermeneutical version of the old philological rule of the 
‘lectio difficilior’.
4. ‘Wirkungsgeschichte’ as an Experience of Distanciation
Since Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode, working on the history of 
efficiency, the history of interpretation and reception32, has become an 
important issue, also in theology. It is doubtlessly a legitimate task, and 
it helps to understand the fundamental historicity of our work as inter-
preters. But once more the problem can be what we aim at with such an 
option. Historicity can be understood in different ways. In Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics, this point concerns the question what is meant with the 
fusion of the horizons. Since for him distanciation is mainly negative, as 
an alienation, the history of efficiency could be understood as a way to 
overcome this disturbing distanciation. In Ricœur’s perspective, historic-
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ity means rather experiencing distanciation in a radical way and holding 
fast in this distanciation, against a too fast fusion of the horizons. There-
fore, I wouldn’t speak of a fusion of horizons in Ricœur’s hermeneutics, 
as Dan Stiver has done33. If appropriation happens through distanciation, 
the distance between the different horizons must be preserved and not 
surpassed.
Distanciation in the Wirkungsgeschichte: that could be the hermeneuti-
cal challenge for church history. This discipline has often been tempted 
by constructing a big History, sustained by a theology of history helping 
to reduce the alterity of time. Coping with distanciation would mean 
rediscovering concrete historicity in the depth of our big Histories, our 
master narratives. I agree with Lieven Boeve34 when he stresses that 
historicity in a deep sense is only possible if our narratives constantly 
stay situated, rooted, and therefore open.
In contrast with this option, we may say that the encyclical Fides 
et ratio35 also has its big History, its master narrative: until high Mid-
dle Age, everything is fine; at the apogee, we find Thomas Aquinas; 
then everything until today goes wrong. To use the terms of the 
Regensburg discourse of Benedict XVI36: after the ideal ‘helleniza-
tion’ of Christianity comes the catastrophe of a ‘dehellenization’, 
favoured in three successive waves by Protestantism (Reformation, 
enlightenment, liberal theology of the 19th century). In my feeling, in 
such a ‘master History’, historicity as a concrete experience of distan-
ciation is stifled.
5.  Fides et ratio: A Lack of Distanciation or a Lack of Theology of the 
Cross
My next point is in the field of systematic theology, as well for dog-
matics as for ethics. I choose the main topic of the encyclical Fides et 
ratio: the relationship between faith and reason. As we have seen in the 
previous point, the encyclical opposes the ideal time of deep conformity 
between faith and reason to the bad time of rupture between them, of 
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them falling apart. This vision of history leads the document to put a 
strong accent on the peaceful cooperation of faith and reason. It’s just 
not possible (or not allowed?) that they enter in concurrence, in fight 
with each other. To say it in a polemic way: things must be arranged so 
that it cannot happen. But, even if the encyclical tries explicitly to avoid 
that danger, it means that both lose their autonomy, or at least that they 
must stay in a clearly delimited autonomy that doesn’t break their inter-
dependency. Because the falling apart must be avoided, cost what it 
may. 
For me, this way of thinking is a good illustration for what happens in 
the case of a lack of distanciation: the interaction gets tamed, paralyzed, 
and in my feeling, there is no more creativity. If the relationship has to 
be vivid, faith and reason must be enabled to struggle with each other. 
There is a third way between rigid conformity and rigid falling apart: it’s 
the vivid interaction of two dimensions giving each other to think again 
and again37.
Ricœur’s hermeneutics can learn us how to cope with the productive 
relationship of two opposed aspects: in his whole work, he tried to create 
dynamic interactions between the voluntary and the involuntary, the 
teleological and the archaeological approach, the conviction and the cri-
tique, the fictive and the historical narration, identity and alterity, and 
once more: appropriation and distanciation.
As Luther especially underlined, in a Christian perspective, such inter-
actions are connected with the dash between the world’s wisdom of the 
message of the crucified Christ. Reading the encyclical as a protestant, 
I was wondering if the document would speak about the foolishness of 
the cross that frustrates the wisdom of the wise in the first epistle to the 
Corinthians, Paul’s theologia crucis. In fact, §23 is dealing with this 
topic, quoting Paul’s argumentation. But the section finishes with the 
remark that Paul’s message “is the reef upon which the link between 
faith and philosophy can break up, but it is also the reef beyond which 
the two can set forth upon the boundless ocean of truth. Here we see not 
only the border between reason and faith, but also the space where the 
two may meet”38. That means the end of the theology of the cross, and 
it never reappears in the whole document. So the lack of distanciation 
has to do with a lack of theologia crucis.
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6. Assailed Certainty as the Condition of the Theologian
I’d like to conclude my series of reflections with an aspect that 
belongs again, like the first one, to fundamental theology. Considered 
from a hermeneutical point of view, theology is an open, quite risky 
effort. But the idea is not quite the same in the encyclical Fides et ratio. 
The adjective ‘hermeneutical’ occurs four times, but always in a more 
or less negative way: it has to do with the dangers of relativism, scep-
ticism and subjectivism. In contrast with this critical approach of 
hermeneutical conscience, the encyclical speaks from the beginning to 
the end, with an incredible evidence of the truth, the absolute, the 
unique, the definitive, the objective truth. Even if it starts in its intro-
duction with the Socratic gnothi seauton, “Know yourself”39, it seems 
to ignore that there is a task of appropriating truth and that appropria-
tion is also disappropriation, expropriation. As Lieven Boeve stressed40, 
truth cannot be grasped in an objective way; it is always connected to 
an attestation, and therefore from an open point of view, engaging sub-
jectivity. On the contrary, the encyclical conceives theology (and phi-
losophy at the same time) without the trouble of having to cope with 
distanciation in the quest of truth. Presupposing “the desire to reach the 
certitude of truth and the certitude of its absolute value”, the encyclical 
underlines: “Whether we admit it or not, there comes for everyone the 
moment when personal existence must be anchored to a truth recog-
nized as final, a truth which confers a certitude no longer open to 
doubt”41.
Reading that on the 31st of October, I cannot avoid to think of the way 
Luther assaulted years ago the false certainties of his time in his 95 the-
ses against the indulgencies. Ricœur doesn’t speak much about Reforma-
tion, but in his hermeneutics of self, Luther’s famous sentence “Here I 
stand. I cannot else” plays an important part42. It appears as an adequate 
sentence for expressing assailed certainty. In my feeling, the only pos-
sible condition for the theologian is such an assailed certainty, a certainty 
that struggles again and again with the distanciation of doubt, bearing 
witness to the truth in a personal attestation. It is also the condition for 
creative work to be done in theology.
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conclusIon: Is the hermeneutIcal ProBlem solvaBle?
My conclusion will be short. “The hermeneutical problem exists, of 
course; but it is solvable”. That is a short quotation from the last para-
graphs of the encyclical Fides et ratio43. Is the hermeneutical problem 
really as easily solvable? The answer is: yes, if we neglect, reject, deny 
the everlasting, or better: the ever and ever returning distanciation in all 
its varieties. Therefore, at the end of this paper, my answer is, against the 
encyclical: no, it is not as easily solvable. If it would, then there would 
be no more need for conferences on Poetics and religion! But that would 
be also the end of a vivid, creative theology and philosophy!
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